ms4023_2025T2_Q1_NA.pdf
Game Theory and Strategy · Quiz 1 · May 2025
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Questions and published explanations below are available without starting a test. Some questions may not have a published solution yet.
Question 303 MCQ · 1.0 marks
The Cobb-Douglas production function F(K,L)=K\(^{p}\)L\(^{q}\)
Never exhibits decreasing returns to scale
Shows constant returns to scale if p+q=1
Has constant marginal product of labour
Has constant marginal product of capital
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 304 MCQ · 1.0 marks
When average product is decreasing in labor, marginal product is greater than average product.
TRUE
FALSE
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 305 MCQ · 1.0 marks
When average product is increasing in labor, marginal product is less than average product.
TRUE
FALSE
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 306 MCQ · 1.0 marks
When average product **AP**L is at a maximum, then marginal product is equal to average product
TRUE
FALSE
**Game Theory and Strategy**
**Section Id :** 64065391708
**Section Number :** 15
**Section type :** Online
**Mandatory or Optional :** Mandatory
**Number of Questions :** 5
**Number of Questions to be attempted :** 5
**Section Marks :** 20
**Display Number Panel :** Yes
**Section Negative Marks :** 0
**Group All Questions :** No
**Enable Mark as Answered Mark for Review and**
No
**Clear Response :**
**Section Maximum Duration :** 0
**Section Minimum Duration :** 0
**Section Time In :** Minutes
**Maximum Instruction Time :** 0
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 308 MCQ · 2.0 marks
**(Choosing a route)**Four people must drive from A to B at the same time. Two routes are available,
one via X and one via Y (Refer to the left panel of following Figure). The roads from A to X, and
from Y to B are both short and narrow; in each case, one car takes 6 minutes, and each additional
car increases the travel time per car by 3 minutes. (If two cars drive from A to X, for example, each
car takes 9 minutes.) The roads from A to Y, and from X to B are long and wide; on A to Y one car
takes 20 minutes, and each additional car increases the travel time per car by 1 minute; on X to B
one car takes 20 minutes, and each additional car increases the travel time per car by 0.9 minutes.
Formulate this situation as a strategic game
[[IMAGE:acc716cd8b03123f_3_0]]
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Choose the correct alternative .
In Nash equilibrium two people take each route
For the NE action profile, each person’s travel time is 28 minutes
Both In Nash equilibrium two people take each route and For the NE action
profile, each person’s travel time is 28 minutes
None
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 309 MCQ · 2.0 marks
**(Choosing a route)**Four people must drive from A to B at the same time. Two routes are available,
one via X and one via Y (Refer to the left panel of following Figure). The roads from A to X, and
from Y to B are both short and narrow; in each case, one car takes 6 minutes, and each additional
car increases the travel time per car by 3 minutes. (If two cars drive from A to X, for example, each
car takes 9 minutes.) The roads from A to Y, and from X to B are long and wide; on A to Y one car
takes 20 minutes, and each additional car increases the travel time per car by 1 minute; on X to B
one car takes 20 minutes, and each additional car increases the travel time per car by 0.9 minutes.
Formulate this situation as a strategic game
[[IMAGE:acc716cd8b03123f_3_0]]
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Now suppose that a relatively short, wide road is built from X to Y, giving each person four options
for travel from A to B: A–X–B, A–Y–B, A–X–Y–B, and A–Y– X–B (As shown in the right panel of the
given figure). Assume that a person who takes A–X–Y–B travels the A–X portion at the same time as
someone who takes A–X–B, and the Y–B portion at the same time as someone who takes A–Y–B.
(Think of there being constant flows of traffic.) On the road between X and Y, one car takes 7
minutes and each additional car increases the travel time per car by 1 minute. Find the Nash
equilibrium in this new situation
Choose the correct alternative
In any Nash equilibrium, one person takes A–X–B, two people take A–X–Y–B,
and one person takes A–Y–B
In this equilibrium profile, every person’s travel time increases compared to
the case when new road was not there
Both In any Nash equilibrium, one person takes A–X–B, two people take
A–X–Y–B, and one person takes A–Y–B and In this equilibrium profile, every person’s travel time
increases compared to the case when new road was not there
None
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 310 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Determined to crack down on the drug trade, a city mayor puts more officers out on patrol to
disrupt the business of drug dealers. A drug dealer in a neighborhood can work his trade either on
a street corner or in the park. Each day, he decides where to set up shop, knowing that word
about his location will travel among users. Because a good snitch is lacking, word does not travel
to the police. The police officer on the beat then needs to decide whether she will patrol the park
or the street corner, while not knowing where the drug dealer is hanging out that day.
The decision of the officer and the dealer determine the extent of drug trades that day. Let
suppose the total number of potential trades in the market is 500. A dealer's payoff is determined
by the number of trades he consummates, while the officer’s payoff is based on the number of
trades she disrupts. The table below illustrates the payoffs for both parties according to their
respective strategies in the game.
[[IMAGE:acc716cd8b03123f_5_1]]
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Choose the correct statement
There is a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategy
There are finitely many Nash equilibria in this game in pure strategy
There is no Nash equilibrium in this game in pure strategy
None
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 311 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Determined to crack down on the drug trade, a city mayor puts more officers out on patrol to
disrupt the business of drug dealers. A drug dealer in a neighborhood can work his trade either on
a street corner or in the park. Each day, he decides where to set up shop, knowing that word
about his location will travel among users. Because a good snitch is lacking, word does not travel
to the police. The police officer on the beat then needs to decide whether she will patrol the park
or the street corner, while not knowing where the drug dealer is hanging out that day.
The decision of the officer and the dealer determine the extent of drug trades that day. Let
suppose the total number of potential trades in the market is 500. A dealer's payoff is determined
by the number of trades he consummates, while the officer’s payoff is based on the number of
trades she disrupts. The table below illustrates the payoffs for both parties according to their
respective strategies in the game.
[[IMAGE:acc716cd8b03123f_5_1]]
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Choose the correct statement .
There is a unique Nash equilibrium in this game
There are finitely many Nash equilibria in this game
There is no Nash equilibrium in this game
None
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 312 NAT · 0.5 marks
Determined to crack down on the drug trade, a city mayor puts more officers out on patrol to
disrupt the business of drug dealers. A drug dealer in a neighborhood can work his trade either on
a street corner or in the park. Each day, he decides where to set up shop, knowing that word
about his location will travel among users. Because a good snitch is lacking, word does not travel
to the police. The police officer on the beat then needs to decide whether she will patrol the park
or the street corner, while not knowing where the drug dealer is hanging out that day.
The decision of the officer and the dealer determine the extent of drug trades that day. Let
suppose the total number of potential trades in the market is 500. A dealer's payoff is determined
by the number of trades he consummates, while the officer’s payoff is based on the number of
trades she disrupts. The table below illustrates the payoffs for both parties according to their
respective strategies in the game.
[[IMAGE:acc716cd8b03123f_5_1]]
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
If randomization probability of a police officer for patrolling the streets is p/q, then p =____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 313 NAT · 0.5 marks
Determined to crack down on the drug trade, a city mayor puts more officers out on patrol to
disrupt the business of drug dealers. A drug dealer in a neighborhood can work his trade either on
a street corner or in the park. Each day, he decides where to set up shop, knowing that word
about his location will travel among users. Because a good snitch is lacking, word does not travel
to the police. The police officer on the beat then needs to decide whether she will patrol the park
or the street corner, while not knowing where the drug dealer is hanging out that day.
The decision of the officer and the dealer determine the extent of drug trades that day. Let
suppose the total number of potential trades in the market is 500. A dealer's payoff is determined
by the number of trades he consummates, while the officer’s payoff is based on the number of
trades she disrupts. The table below illustrates the payoffs for both parties according to their
respective strategies in the game.
[[IMAGE:acc716cd8b03123f_5_1]]
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
If randomization probability of a police officer for patrolling the streets is p/q, then q
=______________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 314 NAT · 0.5 marks
Determined to crack down on the drug trade, a city mayor puts more officers out on patrol to
disrupt the business of drug dealers. A drug dealer in a neighborhood can work his trade either on
a street corner or in the park. Each day, he decides where to set up shop, knowing that word
about his location will travel among users. Because a good snitch is lacking, word does not travel
to the police. The police officer on the beat then needs to decide whether she will patrol the park
or the street corner, while not knowing where the drug dealer is hanging out that day.
The decision of the officer and the dealer determine the extent of drug trades that day. Let
suppose the total number of potential trades in the market is 500. A dealer's payoff is determined
by the number of trades he consummates, while the officer’s payoff is based on the number of
trades she disrupts. The table below illustrates the payoffs for both parties according to their
respective strategies in the game.
[[IMAGE:acc716cd8b03123f_5_1]]
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
If randomization probability of a police officer for patrolling the park is r/s, then r =_____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 315 NAT · 0.5 marks
Determined to crack down on the drug trade, a city mayor puts more officers out on patrol to
disrupt the business of drug dealers. A drug dealer in a neighborhood can work his trade either on
a street corner or in the park. Each day, he decides where to set up shop, knowing that word
about his location will travel among users. Because a good snitch is lacking, word does not travel
to the police. The police officer on the beat then needs to decide whether she will patrol the park
or the street corner, while not knowing where the drug dealer is hanging out that day.
The decision of the officer and the dealer determine the extent of drug trades that day. Let
suppose the total number of potential trades in the market is 500. A dealer's payoff is determined
by the number of trades he consummates, while the officer’s payoff is based on the number of
trades she disrupts. The table below illustrates the payoffs for both parties according to their
respective strategies in the game.
[[IMAGE:acc716cd8b03123f_5_1]]
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
If randomization probability of a police officer for patrolling the park is r/s, then s =_______________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 316 NAT · 1.0 marks
Determined to crack down on the drug trade, a city mayor puts more officers out on patrol to
disrupt the business of drug dealers. A drug dealer in a neighborhood can work his trade either on
a street corner or in the park. Each day, he decides where to set up shop, knowing that word
about his location will travel among users. Because a good snitch is lacking, word does not travel
to the police. The police officer on the beat then needs to decide whether she will patrol the park
or the street corner, while not knowing where the drug dealer is hanging out that day.
The decision of the officer and the dealer determine the extent of drug trades that day. Let
suppose the total number of potential trades in the market is 500. A dealer's payoff is determined
by the number of trades he consummates, while the officer’s payoff is based on the number of
trades she disrupts. The table below illustrates the payoffs for both parties according to their
respective strategies in the game.
[[IMAGE:acc716cd8b03123f_5_1]]
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
If randomization probability of the drug dealer choosing street is β, then β= _______________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 317 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Consider a two-player game in which player 1 can choose A or B. The game ends if he chooses A
while it continues to player 2 if he chooses B. Player 2 can either choose C or D, with the game
ending after C and continuing again with player 1 after D. Player 1 then can choose E or F, and
then the game ends after each of these choices.
Imagine that the payoffs following choice A by player 1 are (2, 0), following C by player 2 are (3, 1),
following E by player 1 are (0, 0) and following F by player 1 are (1, 2) Model this as an extensive
form game and answer the given subquestions:
This is a game of
Perfect information
Imperfect information
None
Can’t be determined
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 318 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Consider a two-player game in which player 1 can choose A or B. The game ends if he chooses A
while it continues to player 2 if he chooses B. Player 2 can either choose C or D, with the game
ending after C and continuing again with player 1 after D. Player 1 then can choose E or F, and
then the game ends after each of these choices.
Imagine that the payoffs following choice A by player 1 are (2, 0), following C by player 2 are (3, 1),
following E by player 1 are (0, 0) and following F by player 1 are (1, 2) Model this as an extensive
form game and answer the given subquestions:
How many terminal nodes does this game have?
3
2
4
5
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 319 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Consider a two-player game in which player 1 can choose A or B. The game ends if he chooses A
while it continues to player 2 if he chooses B. Player 2 can either choose C or D, with the game
ending after C and continuing again with player 1 after D. Player 1 then can choose E or F, and
then the game ends after each of these choices.
Imagine that the payoffs following choice A by player 1 are (2, 0), following C by player 2 are (3, 1),
following E by player 1 are (0, 0) and following F by player 1 are (1, 2) Model this as an extensive
form game and answer the given subquestions:
How many information sets does this game have?
2
3
4
1
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 320 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Consider a two-player game in which player 1 can choose A or B. The game ends if he chooses A
while it continues to player 2 if he chooses B. Player 2 can either choose C or D, with the game
ending after C and continuing again with player 1 after D. Player 1 then can choose E or F, and
then the game ends after each of these choices.
Imagine that the payoffs following choice A by player 1 are (2, 0), following C by player 2 are (3, 1),
following E by player 1 are (0, 0) and following F by player 1 are (1, 2) Model this as an extensive
form game and answer the given subquestions:
How many pure strategies does player 1 have?
1
2
3
4
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 321 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Consider a two-player game in which player 1 can choose A or B. The game ends if he chooses A
while it continues to player 2 if he chooses B. Player 2 can either choose C or D, with the game
ending after C and continuing again with player 1 after D. Player 1 then can choose E or F, and
then the game ends after each of these choices.
Imagine that the payoffs following choice A by player 1 are (2, 0), following C by player 2 are (3, 1),
following E by player 1 are (0, 0) and following F by player 1 are (1, 2) Model this as an extensive
form game and answer the given subquestions:
How many pure strategies does player 2 have?
1
2
3
4
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 322 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Consider a two-player game in which player 1 can choose A or B. The game ends if he chooses A
while it continues to player 2 if he chooses B. Player 2 can either choose C or D, with the game
ending after C and continuing again with player 1 after D. Player 1 then can choose E or F, and
then the game ends after each of these choices.
Imagine that the payoffs following choice A by player 1 are (2, 0), following C by player 2 are (3, 1),
following E by player 1 are (0, 0) and following F by player 1 are (1, 2) Model this as an extensive
form game and answer the given subquestions:
How many pure strategy Nash equilibria does this game have?
1
2
3
4
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 323 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Consider a two-player game in which player 1 can choose A or B. The game ends if he chooses A
while it continues to player 2 if he chooses B. Player 2 can either choose C or D, with the game
ending after C and continuing again with player 1 after D. Player 1 then can choose E or F, and
then the game ends after each of these choices.
Imagine that the payoffs following choice A by player 1 are (2, 0), following C by player 2 are (3, 1),
following E by player 1 are (0, 0) and following F by player 1 are (1, 2) Model this as an extensive
form game and answer the given subquestions:
Which one of the Nash equilibria is also a subgame perfect equilibrium?
(AE, D)
(AF, D)
(BE, C)
(BF, C)
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 324 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Consider a two-player game in which player 1 can choose A or B. The game ends if he chooses A
while it continues to player 2 if he chooses B. Player 2 can either choose C or D, with the game
ending after C and continuing again with player 1 after D. Player 1 then can choose E or F, and
then the game ends after each of these choices.
Imagine that the payoffs following choice A by player 1 are (2, 0), following C by player 2 are (3, 1),
following E by player 1 are (0, 0) and following F by player 1 are (1, 2) Model this as an extensive
form game and answer the given subquestions:
No. of sub games this game has
1
2
3
4
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 325 MCQ · 1.0 marks
[[IMAGE:acc716cd8b03123f_11_2]]
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
[[IMAGE:acc716cd8b03123f_11_3]]
1
1/2
2
1/3
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 326 MCQ · 2.0 marks
[[IMAGE:acc716cd8b03123f_11_2]]
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Choose the correct alternative.
Under Nash equilibrium both players choose e1 = e2 = a .
Equilibrium payoff of a player will be 2a\(^{2}\)
Both Under Nash equilibrium both players choose Under Nash equilibrium
both players choose e1 = e2 = a and Equilibrium payoff of a player will be 2a\(^{2}\)
None
A published solution is not available for this question yet.