ms4023_2025T3_ET_FN.pdf
Game Theory and Strategy · End Term · Sep 2025 FN
← Course papers · Start practice / exam
Questions and published explanations below are available without starting a test. Some questions may not have a published solution yet.
Question 2 NAT · 2.0 marks
Three machines, A, B, and C, produce respectively 50%, 30% and 20% of the total no. of items of a
factory. The percentages of defective output of these machines are 3%, 4% and 5%.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
If an item is selected at random, the probability that the item is defective is ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 3 NAT · 2.0 marks
Three machines, A, B, and C, produce respectively 50%, 30% and 20% of the total no. of items of a
factory. The percentages of defective output of these machines are 3%, 4% and 5%.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Suppose an item is selected at random and found to be defective. The probability that the item
was produced by machine A will be ___________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 4 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Consider the market for a single network good as discussed in the lecture, and write a different
consumer’s utility function for joining the network as [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_2]] capturing the idea that it
may be more plausible that a user who has a higher value for the standalone component of a
technology also assigns more importance to the size of its network (i.e., consumers differ in their
valuation of both the standalone and the network benefits). Here, a is the standalone benefit,
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_3]] measures the network effect, [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_4]] is the expected number of users joining the network and [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_5]]
is uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
The value [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_6]] corresponding to an indifferent consumer for a given price [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_7]] and a given expected
network size [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_8]] will be
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_9]]
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_10]]
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_11]]
None of these
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 5 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Consider the market for a single network good as discussed in the lecture, and write a different
consumer’s utility function for joining the network as [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_2]] capturing the idea that it
may be more plausible that a user who has a higher value for the standalone component of a
technology also assigns more importance to the size of its network (i.e., consumers differ in their
valuation of both the standalone and the network benefits). Here, a is the standalone benefit,
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_3]] measures the network effect, [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_4]] is the expected number of users joining the network and [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_5]]
is uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
The maximum value of p to have buyers will be
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_4_12]]
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_4_13]]
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_4_14]]
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_4_15]]
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 6 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Consider the market for a single network good as discussed in the lecture, and write a different
consumer’s utility function for joining the network as [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_2]] capturing the idea that it
may be more plausible that a user who has a higher value for the standalone component of a
technology also assigns more importance to the size of its network (i.e., consumers differ in their
valuation of both the standalone and the network benefits). Here, a is the standalone benefit,
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_3]] measures the network effect, [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_4]] is the expected number of users joining the network and [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_5]]
is uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
The mass of buyers (n) will be
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_4_16]]
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_4_17]]
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_4_18]]
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_5_19]]
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 7 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Consider the market for a single network good as discussed in the lecture, and write a different
consumer’s utility function for joining the network as [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_2]] capturing the idea that it
may be more plausible that a user who has a higher value for the standalone component of a
technology also assigns more importance to the size of its network (i.e., consumers differ in their
valuation of both the standalone and the network benefits). Here, a is the standalone benefit,
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_3]] measures the network effect, [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_4]] is the expected number of users joining the network and [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_5]]
is uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
The willingness to pay [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_5_20]] for the [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_5_21]] unit of the good when [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_5_22]] units are expected to be
sold will be
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_5_23]]
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_5_24]]
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_5_25]]
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_5_26]]
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 8 MSQ · 1.0 marks
Consider the market for a single network good as discussed in the lecture, and write a different
consumer’s utility function for joining the network as [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_2]] capturing the idea that it
may be more plausible that a user who has a higher value for the standalone component of a
technology also assigns more importance to the size of its network (i.e., consumers differ in their
valuation of both the standalone and the network benefits). Here, a is the standalone benefit,
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_3]] measures the network effect, [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_4]] is the expected number of users joining the network and [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_5]]
is uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_5_27]] is __________ (more than one options are correct)
increasing function of n
decreasing function of n
decreasing function of [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_5_28]]
increasing function of [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_5_29]]
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 9 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Consider the market for a single network good as discussed in the lecture, and write a different
consumer’s utility function for joining the network as [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_2]] capturing the idea that it
may be more plausible that a user who has a higher value for the standalone component of a
technology also assigns more importance to the size of its network (i.e., consumers differ in their
valuation of both the standalone and the network benefits). Here, a is the standalone benefit,
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_3]] measures the network effect, [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_4]] is the expected number of users joining the network and [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_3_5]]
is uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
The fulfilled-expectations demand curve in this setting will be **(consider (1-n)=m)**
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_5_30]]
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_6_31]]
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_6_32]]
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_6_33]]
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 10 NAT · 1.0 marks
Two roommates need to each choose to clean their apartment, and each can choose an amount of
time [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_7_34]] to clean. If their choices are [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_7_35]] and [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_7_36]] , then the player i’s payoff is given by
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_7_37]] . (This payoff function implies that the more one roommate cleans, the less
valuable is cleaning for the other roommate.)
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
What is the best response of roommate 2 if roommate 1 chooses [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_7_38]] ? [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_7_39]] ___________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 11 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Two roommates need to each choose to clean their apartment, and each can choose an amount of
time [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_7_34]] to clean. If their choices are [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_7_35]] and [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_7_36]] , then the player i’s payoff is given by
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_7_37]] . (This payoff function implies that the more one roommate cleans, the less
valuable is cleaning for the other roommate.)
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Any [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_7_40]] is dominated by [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_7_41]] .
True
False
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 12 NAT · 1.0 marks
Two roommates need to each choose to clean their apartment, and each can choose an amount of
time [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_7_34]] to clean. If their choices are [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_7_35]] and [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_7_36]] , then the player i’s payoff is given by
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_7_37]] . (This payoff function implies that the more one roommate cleans, the less
valuable is cleaning for the other roommate.)
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
If the unique, symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategy for this game is represented by
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_7_42]] then the value of [[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_7_43]] will be __________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 13 NAT · 0.2 marks
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley-Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
v(1)= _________________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 14 NAT · 0.2 marks
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley-Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
v(2)= ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 15 NAT · 0.2 marks
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley-Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
v(3) =____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 16 NAT · 0.2 marks
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley-Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
v(4) = ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 17 NAT · 0.2 marks
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley-Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
v(1,2) =____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 18 NAT · 0.2 marks
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley-Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
v(1,3)= ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 19 NAT · 0.2 marks
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley-Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
v(1,4)= ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 20 NAT · 0.2 marks
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley-Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
v(2,3)= ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 21 NAT · 0.2 marks
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley-Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
v(2,4)= ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 22 NAT · 0.2 marks
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley-Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
v(3,4)=____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 23 NAT · 0.2 marks
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley-Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
v(1,2,3)= ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 24 NAT · 0.2 marks
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley-Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
v(1,2,4)= ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 25 NAT · 0.2 marks
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley-Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
v(2,3,4)= ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 26 NAT · 0.2 marks
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley-Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
v(1,3,4)= ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 27 NAT · 0.2 marks
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley-Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
v(1,2,3,4)= ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 28 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley-Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Consider following two statements and choose the correct alternative
(I) This game has symmetrical players.
(II) Players 1 and 2 are only symmetric players.
Only (I) is correct
Only (II) is correct
Both (I) and (II) are correct
None is correct
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 29 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley-Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Consider following two statements and choose the correct alternative
(I) This game has a null player.
(II) Player 4 is null player.
Only (I) is correct
Only (II) is correct
Both (I) and (II) are correct
None is correct
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 30 NAT · 1.0 marks
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley-Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_14_44]]
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 31 NAT · 1.0 marks
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley-Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_14_45]]
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 32 NAT · 1.0 marks
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley-Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_15_46]]
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 33 NAT · 1.0 marks
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley-Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_15_47]]
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 34 NAT · 1.0 marks
A cable TV station wants to connect six new customers to its network. The connections to the
network are described in the following tree graph:
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_16_48]]
Calculate the distribution of the costs among the six players if all six decide to connect to the
network.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
The cost to be paid by Player 1 will be ___________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 35 NAT · 1.0 marks
A cable TV station wants to connect six new customers to its network. The connections to the
network are described in the following tree graph:
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_16_48]]
Calculate the distribution of the costs among the six players if all six decide to connect to the
network.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
The cost to be paid by Player 2 will be __________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 36 NAT · 1.0 marks
A cable TV station wants to connect six new customers to its network. The connections to the
network are described in the following tree graph:
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_16_48]]
Calculate the distribution of the costs among the six players if all six decide to connect to the
network.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
The cost to be paid by Player 3 will be ___________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 37 NAT · 1.0 marks
A cable TV station wants to connect six new customers to its network. The connections to the
network are described in the following tree graph:
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_16_48]]
Calculate the distribution of the costs among the six players if all six decide to connect to the
network.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
The cost to be paid by Player 4 will be ___________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 38 NAT · 1.0 marks
A cable TV station wants to connect six new customers to its network. The connections to the
network are described in the following tree graph:
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_16_48]]
Calculate the distribution of the costs among the six players if all six decide to connect to the
network.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
The cost to be paid by Player 5 will be ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 39 NAT · 1.0 marks
A cable TV station wants to connect six new customers to its network. The connections to the
network are described in the following tree graph:
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_16_48]]
Calculate the distribution of the costs among the six players if all six decide to connect to the
network.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
The cost to be paid by Player 6 will be _____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 40 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Six bidders with private valuations uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 participate in a sealed
bid first price auction. Assuming that everyone is playing the symmetric equilibrium bidding
strategy.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Optimal bid for a bidder with valuation 0.9 will be
0.48
0.65
0.5
0.75
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 41 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Six bidders with private valuations uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 participate in a sealed
bid first price auction. Assuming that everyone is playing the symmetric equilibrium bidding
strategy.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
The expected revenue of the seller in this auction scenario will be
4/5
5/7
2/3
2/5
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 42 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Consider two competing firms in a declining industry that cannot support both firms profitably.
Each firm has three possible choices as it must decide whether or not to exit the industry
immediately, at the end of this quarter, or at the end of the next quarter. If a firm chooses to exit,
then its payoff is 0 from that point onward. Every quarter that both firms operate yields each a
loss equal to −1, and each quarter that a firm operates alone yields a payoff of 2. For example, if
firm 1 plans to exit at the end of this quarter while firm 2 plans to exit at the end of the next
quarter then the payoffs are (−1, 1) because both firms lose −1 in the first quarter and firm 2 gains
2 in the second. The payoff for each firm is the sum of its quarterly payoffs. Formulate this as a
normal form game considering that E denotes immediate exit, T denotes exit this quarter, and N
denote exit next quarter.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
There are no strictly dominated strategies in this game.
True
False
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 43 MCQ · 2.0 marks
Consider two competing firms in a declining industry that cannot support both firms profitably.
Each firm has three possible choices as it must decide whether or not to exit the industry
immediately, at the end of this quarter, or at the end of the next quarter. If a firm chooses to exit,
then its payoff is 0 from that point onward. Every quarter that both firms operate yields each a
loss equal to −1, and each quarter that a firm operates alone yields a payoff of 2. For example, if
firm 1 plans to exit at the end of this quarter while firm 2 plans to exit at the end of the next
quarter then the payoffs are (−1, 1) because both firms lose −1 in the first quarter and firm 2 gains
2 in the second. The payoff for each firm is the sum of its quarterly payoffs. Formulate this as a
normal form game considering that E denotes immediate exit, T denotes exit this quarter, and N
denote exit next quarter.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
weakly dominated strategy in this game is
E
T
N
None
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 44 MSQ · 1.0 marks
Consider two competing firms in a declining industry that cannot support both firms profitably.
Each firm has three possible choices as it must decide whether or not to exit the industry
immediately, at the end of this quarter, or at the end of the next quarter. If a firm chooses to exit,
then its payoff is 0 from that point onward. Every quarter that both firms operate yields each a
loss equal to −1, and each quarter that a firm operates alone yields a payoff of 2. For example, if
firm 1 plans to exit at the end of this quarter while firm 2 plans to exit at the end of the next
quarter then the payoffs are (−1, 1) because both firms lose −1 in the first quarter and firm 2 gains
2 in the second. The payoff for each firm is the sum of its quarterly payoffs. Formulate this as a
normal form game considering that E denotes immediate exit, T denotes exit this quarter, and N
denote exit next quarter.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Pure strategy Nash equilibria in this game are (More than one options correct)
(E, T)
(E, N)
(N, E)
(T, N)
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 45 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Consider two competing firms in a declining industry that cannot support both firms profitably.
Each firm has three possible choices as it must decide whether or not to exit the industry
immediately, at the end of this quarter, or at the end of the next quarter. If a firm chooses to exit,
then its payoff is 0 from that point onward. Every quarter that both firms operate yields each a
loss equal to −1, and each quarter that a firm operates alone yields a payoff of 2. For example, if
firm 1 plans to exit at the end of this quarter while firm 2 plans to exit at the end of the next
quarter then the payoffs are (−1, 1) because both firms lose −1 in the first quarter and firm 2 gains
2 in the second. The payoff for each firm is the sum of its quarterly payoffs. Formulate this as a
normal form game considering that E denotes immediate exit, T denotes exit this quarter, and N
denote exit next quarter.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
This game has unique mixed strategy equilibrium
True
False
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 46 NAT · 2.0 marks
Consider two competing firms in a declining industry that cannot support both firms profitably.
Each firm has three possible choices as it must decide whether or not to exit the industry
immediately, at the end of this quarter, or at the end of the next quarter. If a firm chooses to exit,
then its payoff is 0 from that point onward. Every quarter that both firms operate yields each a
loss equal to −1, and each quarter that a firm operates alone yields a payoff of 2. For example, if
firm 1 plans to exit at the end of this quarter while firm 2 plans to exit at the end of the next
quarter then the payoffs are (−1, 1) because both firms lose −1 in the first quarter and firm 2 gains
2 in the second. The payoff for each firm is the sum of its quarterly payoffs. Formulate this as a
normal form game considering that E denotes immediate exit, T denotes exit this quarter, and N
denote exit next quarter.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
[[IMAGE:474370c417f609b4_20_49]]
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 47 MCQ · 1.0 marks
A man dies, leaving an estate worth 500 units. The deceased has two creditors; one’s claim is 450
units, and the other’s claim, 250 units. The division of the estate between them is carried out
according to the contested garment principle.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Creditor 1 with claim 450 units gets
350
300
200
250
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 48 MCQ · 1.0 marks
A man dies, leaving an estate worth 500 units. The deceased has two creditors; one’s claim is 450
units, and the other’s claim, 250 units. The division of the estate between them is carried out
according to the contested garment principle.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Creditor 2 with claim 250 units gets
150
300
200
250
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 49 NAT · 1.0 marks
Suppose a search engine has two ad slots that it can sell. Slot **a** has a clickthrough rate of 10 and
slot **b** has a clickthrough rate of 5. Three advertisers are interested in these slots. Advertiser **x**
values click at 3 per click, advertiser **y** values click at 2 per click, and advertiser **z** values click at 1
per click.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Total valuation of socially optimal allocation will be ___________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 50 NAT · 1.0 marks
Suppose a search engine has two ad slots that it can sell. Slot **a** has a clickthrough rate of 10 and
slot **b** has a clickthrough rate of 5. Three advertisers are interested in these slots. Advertiser **x**
values click at 3 per click, advertiser **y** values click at 2 per click, and advertiser **z** values click at 1
per click.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
VCG price for slot **a** will be ___________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 51 NAT · 1.0 marks
Suppose a search engine has two ad slots that it can sell. Slot **a** has a clickthrough rate of 10 and
slot **b** has a clickthrough rate of 5. Three advertisers are interested in these slots. Advertiser **x**
values click at 3 per click, advertiser **y** values click at 2 per click, and advertiser **z** values click at 1
per click.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
VCG price for slot **b** will be ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Question 52 MCQ · 2.0 marks
Suppose 6 numbers are drawn independently from the uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1]
and then sorted from smallest to largest. The expected value of the number in third position on
the list is
5/6
3/7
1/2
1/3
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Question 53 MCQ · 1.0 marks
Choose the correct alternative
A stable matching system is necessarily a system under which everyone is
satisfied.
A matching system is stable when an unmatched pair may find it beneficial to
deviate from the matching and form their own match.
A stable matching system is necessarily a system under which everyone is
satisfied & A matching system is stable when an unmatched pair may find it beneficial to deviate
from the matching and form their own match.
None of these
A published solution is not available for this question yet.